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A B STR ACT
Suppose that a social behaviour norm specifies ethical decisions at all decision 
nodes of every finite decision tree whose terminal nodes have consequences in a 
given domain. Suppose too that behaviour is both consistent in subtrees, and con­
tinuous as probabilities vary. Suppose that the social consequence domain consists 
of profiles of individual consequences defined broadly enough so that only individ­
uals’ random consequences should matter, and not the structure of any decision 
tree. Finally, suppose that each individual has a “welfare behaviour norm” coin­
ciding with the social norm for decision trees where only that individual’s random 
consequences are affected by any decision. Then, after suitable normalizations, 
the social norm must maximize the expected value of a sum of individual wel­
fare functions over the feasible set of random consequences. Moreover, individuals 
who never exist can be accorded a zero welfare level provided that any decision 
is acceptable on their behalf. These arguments lead to a social objective whose 
structural form is that of classical utilitarianism, even though individual welfare 






















































































































































































Normative social choice theory may have started out as a discussion of how 
to design suitable political systems and voting schemes —  as in the work of well- 
known writers like Borda (1781), Condorcet (1785), Dodgson (1884), Black (1948) 
and Arrow (1951, 1963). Yet, in its attempt to aggregate individual preferences 
or interests into some kind of collective choice criterion, it would appear equally 
suited to the general issue of how to make good decisions which affect several 
different individuals. This, of course, is the subject of ethics in general, rather 
than just of political philosophy. After all, the design of suitable political systems 
is just one particular kind of ethical issue. So is the design of economic systems, 
and even the adjustment of features like tax rates within an existing system.
This suggests that we should be most interested in a normative social choice 
theory that seems capable of handling practical ethical problems. My claim will be 
that a properly constructed form of utilitarianism has the best chance of passing 
this crucial test. Indeed, there are three main strands of normative social choice 
theory. Of these the first is based on Arrow’s original ideas, while the next two are 
based on succeeding major developments due to Harsanyi (1953, 1955, 1976, 1977, 
1978) and Sen (1970a, b, 1977, 1982) respectively. Of these only the Harsanyi 
theory, when suitably modified, appears not to create insuperable difficulties for a 
complete theory of ethical decision-making.
The limitations of Arrow’s theory are fairly well understood, not least by 
Arrow himself. His crucial assumption was the avoidance of interpersonal com­
parisons — at least until the discussion of “extended sympathy” in the second 
edition of Social Choice and Individual Values, and a later (Arrow, 1977) article 
generously acknowledging the potential usefulness of work that d ’Aspremont and 
Gevers (1977) and I (Hammond, 1976) had done in the 1970’s, building on Sen’s 
ideas (and those of Suppes, 1966). The four axioms of Arrow’s impossibility the­
orem —  namely, unrestricted domain, independence of irrelevant alternatives, the 




























































































“social welfare function” is generalized to allow interpersonal comparisons (Ham­
mond, 1976, 1991a). It might have been better, however, if Arrow’s “independence 
of irrelevant alternatives” axiom had been called “independence of irrelevant per­
sonal comparisons” instead, since this can then be weakened to “independence of 
irrelevant interpersonal comparisons” when interpersonal comparisons are allowed.
Sen’s approach, by contrast, uses “social welfare functionals” that map profiles 
of interpersonally comparable utility functions into social orderings. These do 
allow interpersonal comparisons. It therefore did not automatically exclude rules 
such as Harsanyi’s (or classical) utilitarianism and Rawlsian maximin. Indeed, 
as d’Aspremont and Gevers (1977), Roberts (1980), Blackorby, Donaldson and 
Weymark (1984), d’Aspremont (1985) and others have pointed out, there are many 
different possibilities. Actually, this indeterminacy of the social welfare functional 
could well be regarded as a serious weakness of Sen’s approach.
Other weaknesses, however, appear even more serious. For there are also sev­
eral important questions for any ethical theory of this kind, based as it is on a 
social ordering, derived from unexplained interpersonal comparisons of personal 
utility, without making very clear what constitutes personal utility or what inter­
personal comparisons are supposed to mean. These weaknesses were also present 
in my own earlier work on social choice theory.
Ultimately, in order to overcome all these defects, it would seem that a social- 
choice theoretic approach to ethical decision problems should be able to provide 
answers to the following important questions:
1) Why have a social ordering at all, instead of incomplete preferences such as 
those which lie behind the Pareto rule, or even some completely unpatterned 
social choice rule which obeys none of the usual axioms of rational choice?
2) Which individual preferences, and which individuals’ preferences, should be 
reflected in the social choice rule? (The “which individuals” issue arises when 
we consider whether and how to include foreigners, animals and unborn gen­




























































































3) What method of making interpersonal comparisons, if any, is the right one to 
use when arriving at the social choice rule, and what are these interpersonal 
comparisons meant to represent?
4) What should count in addition to individual preferences (or welfare)? Is it 
right that society should have preferences over issues like diet or religion which 
are usually regarded as purely personal? Do such personal issues force us to 
consider “non-welfarist” theories?
The theory I shall review in the following pages has grown over the years 
out of attempts to answer these and related questions. It is a utilitarian theory, 
but with “utility” defined in quite a different way from what almost all versions 
of utilitarianism seem to have used in the past. Indeed, an individual’s utility 
— or rather, “welfare” as I shall call it to distinguish it from other concepts 
of utility that have been used in the past — will be regarded as that function 
whose expected value ought to be maximized by decisions affecting only that 
particular individual. This implies that welfare acquires purely ethical significance. 
The relevance of personal tastes, preferences, desires, happiness to this ethical 
measure of an individual’s welfare then becomes an ethical question, which is 
exactly what I believe it should be. Moreover, interpersonal comparisons will 
amount to preferences for different kinds of people —  for rich over poor, for healthy 
over sick, for educated over ignorant, for talented over unskilled, etc. Note carefully 
that such preferences do not imply a disregard for those individuals who either 
are or will be unfortunate enough to experience poverty, sickness, ignorance or 
lack of skills. Rather, such preferences represent society’s present and future gains 
from enriching the poor, healing the sick, educating the ignorant, and training 
the unskilled. In addition, there will be a zero level of utility which marks the 
threshold between the desirability and undesirability of adding an extra individual 
to the world’s population. Finally, utility ratios will represent marginal rates of 
substitution between numbers of indifferent kinds of individual.




























































































properly multi-stage ethical decisions, represented as ethical decision trees, while 
at the same time recognizing that there is some concept of individual welfare which 
ought to determine ethical decisions. In particular, for decisions which affect 
only one individual, only that individual’s welfare ought to matter. Of course, 
this excludes non-welfarist ethical theories by assumption. But I shall argue that 
everything of ethical relevance to individuals can be included in our measures of 
the welfare of individuals, and that nothing else should matter anyway.
The first part of this paper is a review of the consequentialist approach to 
Bayesian decision theory. Section 2 explains why a new approach may be desirable, 
especially in connection with ethics and social choice theory. Section 3 considers 
ethical behaviour norms in finite decision trees under uncertainty and presents 
the two important axioms of unrestricted domain and consistency in continuation 
subtrees. Thereafter Section 4 explains the motivation for the “consequentialist” 
axiom, according to which only the consequences of behaviour in decision trees 
are relevant to proper decision making. The next few sections are inevitably 
rather more technical and cite results proved in Hammond (1988a). Section 5 
discusses how the three axioms together imply the existence of an ethical preference 
ordering over uncertain consequences that satisfies the controversial independence 
axiom. Section 6 adds an extra continuity axiom which implies expected utility 
maximization.
The second part of the paper is much more directly concerned with ethics. 
Section 7 begins to apply the consequentialist decision theory of the first part of 
the paper to ethical decision problems concerning a society of individuals. To 
do so it introduces personal consequences, so that a social consequence is just 
a profile of personal consequences. Then Section 8 puts forward the hypothesis 
of individualistic consequentialism, according to which it is only the marginal 
distribution of each individual’s personal consequences which is relevant to ethical 
decision making. In other words, it does not matter at all how different individuals’ 





























































































While individualistic consequentialism captures one aspect of individualism, 
it does not give rise to any idea that social welfare arises from the individual wel­
fares of different persons in society. This is remedied in Section 9, which introduces 
the concept of “individual welfarism.” It is assumed that, just as society has its 
ethical behaviour norm for social decision trees, so there is an ethical behaviour 
norm for “individual decision trees.” Such trees are particular social decision trees 
in which there is only one individual whose probability distribution of personal 
consequences can be affected by any decision that is taken. It is required that the 
social behaviour norm in any such individual decision tree should exactly match 
the ethical behaviour norm for the relevant individual. Under the consequentialist 
axioms of Sections 3-6, as well as the new conditions set out in Sections 7 and 8, 
individual welfarism implies the existence of a cardinal equivalence class of indi­
vidual welfare functions for each individual, whose expected values are maximized 
by decisions corresponding to the individual norm.
Section 10 goes on to show, moreover, that the conditions of Harsanyi’s (1955) 
utilitarian theorem are all satisfied. Thus there exists a cardinal equivalence class 
of social welfare functions whose expected values are maximized by the social 
norm, and which can be expressed as the sum of suitably normalized individual 
welfare functions. So the social welfare functional linking individual and social 
welfare functions is simply additive, as in classical utilitarianism. As is pointed 
out in Section 10, however, the individual welfare functions which ought to be 
added have a very different interpretation from the classical concept of utility.
In Section 11 the vexed question of optimal population is taken up. It is 
assumed that individuals who never come into existence can be ignored unless at 
least one decision being contemplated could lead to their coming into existence. 
That is, in any individual decision tree where the only individual affected never 
comes into existence anyway, it does not matter what decision is made. This 




























































































sponding to non-existence. It is possible then to normalize the individual welfare 
function so that this level is zero. The implication is that it is only necessary to 
sum the individual welfares of those individuals who do come into existence; all 
other individuals’ welfare levels are zero and so their welfare can be ignored.
A crucial question raised above was how to make sense of the interpersonal 
comparisons which are needed in any satisfactory resolution of Arrow’s impossi­
bility theorem. This is the topic of Section 12 which, as promised, shows how the 
utilitarian objective being propounded here relates interpersonal comparisons to, 
logically enough, social preferences for different kinds of persons.
The final Section 13 contains a concluding assessment of what has been 
achieved so far in this research project.
2. Bayesian Decision Theory
How does one make good ethical decisions? This is obviously the main ques­
tion in any ethical theory which is going to arrive at specific recommendations 
for action. Moreover, this question is not so different from the general problem of 
how to make good decisions in general, which is the subject of decision theory. As 
in that theory, it will be helpful to consider what acts are possible, what conse­
quences those acts lead to, and how those consequences should be evaluated. The 
only special features of ethical decision theory, in fact, are the kind of consequence 
which we shall admit as relevant, and the way we think about and evaluate those 
consequences.
In normative decision theory, a standard axiomatic approach was formulated 
during the 1940’s and 1950’s, based upon the major contributions of von Neumann 
and Morgenstem and Savage in particular. It involved a system of axioms whose 
implication was that agents should have subjective probabilities about uncertain 
events, and a (cardinal) utility function for evaluating consequences. Moreover, the 
best action was that which would maximize expected utility. This is the approach 




























































































Even as a normative standard, this theory has come under heavy attack in 
recent years. Yet, with a few exceptions such as Machina (1989) and McClennen 
(1990), it seems to me that most of the critics have not really fully understood 
the theory. In particular, they have often failed to appreciate how adaptable it 
is, and how it can handle many of the familiar criticisms by a suitable extension 
of the concept of a relevant “consequence.” In addition, it must be pointed out 
that the usual framework in which the axioms of decision theory are presented 
is very special. Following von Neumann and Morgenstern’s recommended pro­
cedure, complicated intertemporal decision problems are generally collapsed into 
their “normal form,” in which the decision maker makes a single choice of strat­
egy or plan which is intended to cover all possible future contingencies. Yet real 
decision problems offer the chance to change one’s mind in future, since decisions 
are not usually made as irrevocable commitments to a particular strategy. And, 
as I have pointed out before (Hammond, 1988c, 1989), the main alternatives to 
Bayesian decision theory, with its criterion of maximizing expected utility, create 
for the decision-maker the risk that ex ante plans will not be carried out but will 
get revised later, even though nothing unforeseen has happened in the meantime. 
This is very like the inconsistency phenomenon in dynamic choice which Strotz 
(1956) was the first to explore formally; it is also related to “subgame imperfec­
tions” of the kind first considered by Selten (1965) in n-person game theory.
One of the most fundamental axioms of Bayesian decision theory is the ex­
istence of a preference ordering over the space of event-contingent consequences. 
With the notable exceptions of Levi (1974, 1980, 1986), Seidenfeld (1988a, b) and 
Bewley (1986), even most critics of the theory accept this axiom. Yet many eth­
ical theorists do not. Some of these simply claim that nobody has any business 
constructing a “social preference ordering” over decisions or the consequences to 
which they lead. Others seem to find it objectionable that anything as subtle and 
complicated as ethics could be reduced to something as conceptually simple or 
crude as the maximization of a preference ordering. This, however, overlooks the 




























































































it could still range over an immensely complicated space of ethically relevant con­
sequences. As an analogy, the original Zermelo (1913) theory of two-person games 
with complete information shows how each player has an optimal strategy in chess, 
specifying what move should be made in each possible position. It is inconceivable 
that the optimal strategy could even be found, however, because chess is far too 
complicated and subtle a game (and the Japanese game of Go, to which the same 
argument applies, is perhaps even more so).
In an attempt to meet all these cogent objections, I have therefore been devel­
oping a different justification for Bayesian decision theory. The standard axioms 
emerge as implications of what may seem less objectionable “consequentialist” 
axioms. Rather than assume that there is a preference ordering, the new theory 
proves that behaviour must reveal such an ordering. Under an additional minor 
but necessary continuity axiom, it also proves that there exists a unique cardi­
nal equivalence class of utility functions whose expected value is maximized. Of 
course, the proofs of such results do rely on other axioms, but they may seem less 
unnatural or open to criticism than many have found the standard axioms to be.
3. Decision Trees and Ethical Theories
The approach I have adopted begins by recognizing that there are multi-stage 
decision problems which can be described by means of decision trees. The typical 
decision tree will be denoted by T. It has a set of nodes N. To avoid unnecessary 
technical complications, I shall work only with finite trees —  i.e., trees for which 
N is finite. Among the nodes in N  is a subset N * of decision nodes, at which the 
decision maker is offered the choice of several different possible actions.
To represent uncertainty, there will also be a set N° of chance nodes at which 
“nature makes a decision” outside the decision-maker’s control. Really we should 
now follow the argument presented in Hammond (1988a) and discuss decision 
theory in the absence of probabilities, seeing what assumptions are needed in 
order to ensure the existence of at least subjective probabilities. Rather than do 




























































































there is always an associated probability distribution 7r(n'|n) over the finite set 
iV+i(n) of nodes n' which immediately succeed n. To avoid problems that arise 
in continuation subtrees which are only reached with probability zero, it will be 
assumed here that any node n' e  N+i(n) for which 7r(n'|n) =  0 gets “pruned” 
from the decision tree, along with the set N(n') of all succeeding nodes. Then 
only nodes n' for which 7r(n'|n) is positive will remain, and so we can indeed 
assume that n(n'\n) >  0 whenever n 6 N° and n' e  N+i(n).
Any decision tree T starts at an initial node no, which could be either a 
decision node or a chance node. Since the tree is finite, it must also have a set 
X  of terminal nodes at which everything has been resolved. Then N  must be the 
union N* U N° U X  of the three disjoint sets N*, N° and X .
Nature’s “choices” of events and the decision-maker’s choices of acts will com­
bine to determine a unique path through the decision tree, starting at the initial 
node n0 and ending at some terminal node x e  X . In fact there is an obvious 
one-to-one correspondence between paths through the tree and terminal nodes. 
Along any such path, there will be a history of ethically relevant consequences 
which can be summarized as just a consequence y in some domain of consequences 
Y. It does no harm then to think of there being a unique consequence attached 
to each terminal node of the tree — in other words, there is a function 7  : X  —> Y  
mapping each terminal node x of the decision tree into the consequence 7 (1 ) of 
following through the tree the unique path which ends at x. It is assumed that 
ethical decisions should depend only on their different consequences y in a fixed 
consequence domain Y\ consequences outside Y  are ethically irrelevant.
Each path through the decision tree also corresponds to a unique sequence of 
choices by nature, which then determines a history of events. Since the probabili­
ties 7r(n'|n) of these successive choices have been specified, there is a corresponding 
probability £(x) of reaching any given terminal node x G X  and then of getting 
the consequence In fact decisions will give rise to probability distributions




























































































An ethical theory will then consist of the following three items:
(i) a consequence domain Y  of possible ethical consequences;
(ii) a tree domain T  of finite decision trees whose terminal nodes x 6 X  are 
mapped into consequences ~f(x) 6 Y\
(iii) a behaviour norm /? which specifies, for each decision node n 6 N * of each 
decision tree T in the tree domain T, a non-empty behaviour set f3(T,n) of 
decisions which are ethically appropriate, or recommended, at the particular 
decision node n.
Two important axioms will now be imposed upon such an ethical theory. 
The first is that of an unrestricted domain: it is required that the tree domain 
T  should consist of all logically possible finite decision trees, each with its own 
mapping 7  : X  —* Y  from terminal nodes to appropriate ethical consequences. 
Any theory which applies to only a restricted domain of decision trees will not be 
able to handle some ethical decision problems which might conceivably arise, or 
which a complete theory should be able to handle even if the problem is entirely 
hypothetical. Thus, having an unrestricted domain seems necessary for a complete 
ethical theory.
The second axiom is consistency in continuation subtrees (or “consistency” for 
short). At any node n of a decision tree T, there is a corresponding continuation 
subtree T(n) which is obtained by cutting T just before the node n, and retaining 
what gardeners would call a “cutting” consisting of both that node and all its 
successors in T . This subtree is, of course, a decision tree in its own right with 
an initial node n which is just after the cut and the set of nodes N (n) which is 
a subset of N, the set of nodes in the original tree. Its terminal nodes belong to 
X (n )  the set of those terminal nodes 1  £ I  of the original decision tree which 
succeed the initial node of the subtree — i.e., X (n ) — X  D N(n). The terminal 
nodes x 6 X (n ) in the subtree are still mapped by 7  into consequences — that is, 
7 (2:) remains well defined for all x 6 X (n).




























































































T{ n) is in the tree domain T. So the behaviour norm /? is defined at each decision 
node n £ N*(n) =  N * PI N(n) of the continuation subtree T(n). Yet each such 
node is identical to a decision node n 6 TV* of the original tree. All that has 
happened in passing from tree T  to tree T(n) is that time has progressed, so that 
the set of possible courses of history has become narrowed. This is inevitable. So 
the description of behaviour fl(T, n ') at each decision node n' of the continuation 
subtree should be the same, regardless of whether we think of n' as a node of 
the subtree T(n) or as a node of the original tree T. Since the behaviour norm 
must describe possible behaviour, it is therefore required to specify the same set 
of decisions /3(X(n),n') at each decision node n' £ N*(n) of the continuation 
subtree as it does at the corresponding node of the full tree. In other words, 
/3(T(n),n ') =  /3(T,n') whenever n £ N and n' £ N*(n). This is (continuation) 
consistency.
In a sense, this consistency condition is almost tautological. For, when a 
specific decision node n £ N* is reached, the decision maker is really faced only 
with the continuation subtree T(n) starting at that node. What counts, therefore, 
is the behaviour set /J(X(n),n) which the norm prescribes for that decision node 
in the continuation tree. If this differs from /3(T,n), which was prescribed for 
the same decision node in the earlier and larger, decision trees T, then this earlier 
recommendation really carries no force (unless it is recalled as an ethically relevant 
resolution to behave in a certain way, in which cause the history of consequences 
should be expanded to include such resolutions and whether they become honoured 
or not). In which case we might as well define the behaviour set P(T,n) at each 
decision node n £ N* of a decision tree T as the value of the behaviour set 
f}(T (n),n) at node n in the continuation tree T(n) which starts at that node. The 
result will then be a behaviour norm which is automatically consistent because one 





























































































A fundamental postulate of decision theory is that behaviour should be en­
tirely explicable by its consequences. Indeed, this is so fundamental that standard 
decision theories such as that due to Savage have even defined an act as a mapping 
from states of the world into consequences. Obviously then, for Savage and other 
decision theorists, two acts which give rise to identical patterns of state contingent 
consequences are completely equivalent.
In ethics, the doctrine that an act should be judged by its consequences has 
been much more controversial. The idea can certainly be traced back to Aristotle, 
who wrote as follows:
If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its 
own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this), and if we 
do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for at that rate 
the process would go on to infinity; so that our desire would be empty 
and vain), clearly this must be the good and the chief good.
— Aristotle, Niomachean Ethics, 1094a 18.
Later, St. Thomas Aquinas sought to refute Aristotelian doctrine, and effec­
tively defined consequentialism by defining its negation:
A consequence cannot make evil an action that was good nor good an 
action that was evil.
More recently, Mill (see Warnock, 1962) and Moore (1912, p. 121) can be 
counted among those who thought that consequences are what matter about acts. 
The term “consequentialism” itself, however, seems rather recent — it was used 
by Anscombe (1958) to describe a doctrine she wished to criticize. The attacks 
have continued. Williams (1973) sought to rebut not only utilitarianism, but also 
consequentialism of which it is a special case. In Williams (1985), he dismisses it in 
barely half a sentence as merely an elementary error. Sen and Williams (1982) had 
chosen “Beyond Utilitarianism” as the title of their volume until it was pointed 
out that some contributors were reluctant to step beyond utilitarianism, and so 




























































































Sen (1987, pp. 74-78; and the articles cited there) has also remained a critic, 
even though his attacks may have become muted over the years. In fact, he has 
recognized the argument (which Williams had made earlier) that one could extend 
the domain of consequences until it incorporated everything relevant to the ethical 
merits of any act. What remains at issue, then, is included in the following passage 
from Sen (1987, pp. 75-76):
Consequentialism . ..  demands, in particular, that the rightness of ac­
tions be judged entirely by the goodness of consequences, and this is a 
demand not merely of taking consequences into account, but of ignoring 
everything else. Of course, the dichotomy can be reduced by seeing con­
sequences in very broad terms, including the value of actions performed 
or the disvalue of violated rights. I  have tried to argue elsewhere [Sen, 
1982b, 1983]:
1. that such broadening is helpful, even essential; but
2. that nevertheless even after fully fledged broadening, there can re­
main a gap between consequentialist evaluation and consequence- 
sensitive deontological assessment.
Except for the last item 2, I agree almost entirely with everything here. What 
I deny, however, is that a gap remains. I claim that any apparent gap can be 
closed by expanding the domain of consequences even further, if necessary, in 
order to embrace all possible results of any “deontological assessment” which were 
not included in the original domain of consequences. As Williams recognized, 
this makes consequentialism become a tautology. In the past, the tautology has 
sometimes been described as “meaningless.” I am perfectly willing to admit that 
consequentialism does only acquire meaning with reference to some specific domain 
of consequences, in which case the tautology has been removed. But I would 
rather that future debates could be about what consequences really should be 
included in the domain because they are ethically relevant, rather than about 
the appropriateness of a doctrine which can be made into a tautology anyway. 
And if the term “consequence” remains anathema, we can perhaps change it to 
something else like “assessment.” By doing so, however, we sever the convenient 






























































































Let us proceed, then, to consider what it means for our ethical theory if ac­
tions are judged entirely by their consequences. Obviously, it must mean that our 
apparatus of decision trees whose terminal nodes have consequences is sufficient 
to describe the ethical decision problems which they represent. If two decision 
trees are identical, they represent the same decision problem. There is no need 
to concern ourselves with differences between the two problems when the con­
sequences that are available in the decision tree and also in each continuation 
subtree are entirely equivalent. Behaviour should be equivalent at each (equiva­
lent) division node of the two equivalent trees, and lead to an identical pattern of 
state-contingent consequences.
In fact the consequentialist hypothesis is stronger than this, but not too dis­
similar in spirit. What it adds is the idea that not even the structure of the 
decision tree is important (unless it somehow affects the consequences which the 
decision maker has available). The hypothesis requires that the (choice set of) 
consequences of prescribed behaviour should be entirely explicable by the (feasible 
set of) consequences of possible behaviour. To explain this properly requires a 
somewhat careful construction of the feasible set and the associated choice set.
Take the feasible set F (T ) first. Its members are precisely those probability 
distributions p(y) over the consequence domain Y  which can result from some 
decision strategy which is available in the tree T  — i.e., from some rule specifying 
a unique action a(n) £ N+i(n) at every decision node n £ N*. Write A (y )  for 
the set of all probability distributions over Y  which attach positive probability 
to only a finite subset of Y  (called the support of the distribution). Then every 
decision strategy results in a unique probability distribution p(-) £ A (T ). Indeed, 
if £a(x) (x £ X )  denotes the probability distribution over terminal nodes in X  
that is induced by the actions a(n) (n £ IV*), then




























































































is the probability of consequence y, for each y £ Y. That is, the probability of y 
is the total probability of all the different terminal nodes x for which 7 (2 ) =  y.
The feasible set F (T ) can now be constructed by backward recursion, starting 
at terminal nodes x £ X  where only a single determinate consequence 7 (2 ) £ Y 
is possible. So F (T (x ))  =  {x-y(a;)} — be., the only member of F (T (x)) is the 
degenerate probability distribution X-t(x) which attaches probability one to the 
particular consequence 7 (2 ). At previous chance nodes n £ N° the feasible set 
F (T (n)) is given by
F (T (n )) =  £  5r(n'|n) F(T(n')).
*— ' n 'e N + l (n)
That is, i*’(T (n)) consists of all possible probability distributions which result 
from combining into a compound lottery in an appropriate way the members of 
the respective feasible sets F(T (n')) at each possible immediately succeeding node 
n' 6 jV+i(n). This is because nature’s next move will determine which term 
F (T (n')) of the sum will be appropriate, and these different terms occur with 
probabilities 7r(ra'|n) (n' 6 N+i(n)). And, at previous decision nodes n £ JV*, 
the feasible set F (T (n)) is the union U„<g^+1(„) F (T (n ')) of all the feasible sets 
F (T (n')) at the immediately succeeding nodes n' £ iV+i(n). This is because the 
decision maker’s next move to n' £ iV+ 1 (n) will determine which set F (T (n')) of 
this union will be possible after that move. Moreover, it can easily be shown, by 
backward induction on n, that F(T{n)) C A (Y ) for each n £ N.
Since the tree is finite, this backward recursion must eventually terminate at 
the initial node no of the tree, and yield the appropriate feasible set of contingent 
consequences F (T ) =  F (T (n0)).
The choice set $p(T), on the other hand, will consist of those random con­
sequences which can result from some prescribed decision strategy a(n) —  i.e., a 
strategy which, at each decision node n £ N * of the given tree, selects a single 
member a(n) of the behaviour set /3(T,n) C IV-fi(n) which the ethical behaviour 
norm prescribes for that node. This set can be constructed by backward recursion 




























































































n £ N°, the choice set p(T(n)) consists, as before, of the probability weighted 
sum Yln'ejv+1 (n) T{n'\n) ^s(T {n ')) of all the choice sets $p(T(n ')) at the imme­
diately succeeding nodes n' £ lV+i(n); at each decision node n £ N*, on the other 
hand, the choice set $p(T(n)) consists of the union Un'ep(T,n)$ p{T (n ')) of the 
choice sets at only those immediately succeeding nodes n' £ /3(X, n) which could 
result from prescribed behaviour at node n. This backward recursion again termi­
nates at the initial node, and yields the appropriate choice set $ /j(T ) =  $p(T(no)) 
of contingent consequences which could result from following the prescribed be­
haviour norm /? throughout the whole decision tree X. Obviously, this choice set 
is a non-empty subset of the feasible set F(X) — as is easily proved by considering 
each step of the backward recursion in turn and using mathematical induction. 
The choice set d'^(T) could consist of the whole feasible set, it should be remem­
bered.
After these necessary preliminaries, the crucial hypothesis of consequential- 
ist behaviour can be stated. It requires that, whenever two decision trees T and 
T' have identical feasible sets of contingent consequences F (T ) =  F (T '), the two 
choice sets $p(T) =  <bp(T') must also be equal. If this is true, the ethical theory 
is said to be consequentialist. In fact there must exist a “revealed” consequentialist 
choice function Cp mapping each non-empty finite feasible set F  C A (X ) of ran­
dom consequences p(y) into the choice set Cp(F) which is a non-empty subset of 
the feasible set F. This revealed choice function must satisfy $^(X ) =  Cp{F{T)) 
for all finite decision trees T £ X.
So far, then, the following three axioms have been formulated for normative 
behaviour in decision trees: (i) unrestricted domain; (ii) consistency in continua­
tion subtrees; (iii) consequentialism. Following the arguments presented elsewhere 
(Hammond, 1988a), these three axioms imply that there exists a (complete and 
transitive) revealed preference ordering Rp on the set A (X ) with the property that
Cp(F) =  { p e F \ q e F = > p R p q }  




























































































Moreover, one other important property also follows from these three axioms. 
This is the controversial independence condition, according to which the revealed 
preference ordering Rp on A (F ) must satisfy
[ap +  (1 -  ar)pj Rp [otq +  (1 -  a)p] <t=> pRpq
whenever p,p,q  € A( T) and 0 < a  <  1.
As pointed out in Hammond (1988a), however, these are the only restrictions 
on behaviour which the three axioms imply. That is, given any preference ordering 
R  satisfying the independence condition, behaviour which leads to the set of all 
random consequences that maximize this preference ordering in each possible finite 
decision tree will certainly satisfy the three axioms.
Although the independence condition is implied by expected utility maxi­
mization and is usually formulated as one of the axioms implying expected utility 
maximization, the three axioms enunciated here do not on their own imply ex­
pected utility maximization. The reason is that the revealed preference ordering 
Rp could still be discontinuous and not admit any utility representation at all. In­
deed, consider the case when Y  consists of three different members y* (fc =  1,2,3)- 
Then an ordering satisfying the independence axiom is given by
pRpq <=> b(i/i) > 9(2/1)] or [p(yi) = 9(l/i) and p(l/2) > q(V2)]-
This is a lexicographic preference ordering, of course, giving priority first to in­
creasing the probability of y\ but then, if this probability can be increased no 
further, recognizing as desirable increases in the probability of t/2 (and so, since 




























































































6. Continuity and Expected Utility
Such discontinuous preferences are easily excluded by imposing an additional 
axiom of continuity on behaviour norms in decision trees. Specifically, let T m 
(m =  1 , 2, . . . )  be any infinite sequence of decision trees which all have the same 
sets of decision nodes TV*, chance nodes TV0, and terminal nodes X , the same sets 
N+1(n) of nodes immediately succeeding each node n 6 TV, and the same mapping 
7  : X  —> Y  from terminal nodes to consequences. The only way in which the 
trees T m differ is in the probability distribution 7rm(rc'|?i) (n' £ TV+i(n) ) at each 
chance node n £ TV0. Moreover, assume that jrm(n'|n) —> 7r(n'|n) as m —» oo, 
where 7r(n'|n) > 0 (all n £ TV0, n' £ TV+1 (n)). Then the behaviour norm f)(T,n) 
is said to be continuous if, whenever n £ TV* and n' £ {3(Tm. rt) for all large m, 
then n' £ /?(T, n ).
It is not difficult to prove that this additional continuity axiom implies that 
the revealed preferences ordering Rp is continuous as well, in the sense that for all 
p £ A (F ) the two preference sets
{P  £ A(U ) | p R p p }, {p  e  X (Y )\ p R p p )
are both closed sets of A (y ). Then the ordering Rp can certainly be represented by 
a utility function U defined on A(K ), in the sense that pRp q ■{=> U(p) > U(q) 
for all pairs p,q £ A (Y ). Moreover the independence condition implies (Herstein 
and Milnor, 1953) that U(p) can be chosen so that it takes the expected utility 
form
u (p ) =  Y .seV r t y ) v(y)
for some unique cardinal equivalence class of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility 




























































































7. Social Norms and Personal Consequences
Having developed the basic decision theory, the next stage of the argument is 
much more directly concerned with ethical decisions whose consequences can affect 
many individuals simultaneously. To represent such consequences, the domain Y  
will now be given much more structure.
As in social choice theory, assume that there is some basic set A  o f possible 
social states a £ A. The membership M  of a society is just the set of individuals i 
in that society. Given any i £ M , write A, for a copy of the set A whose members 
a, are i ’s personalized social states. As in the theory of public goods (Milleron, 
1972 etc.) it helps to imagine that we can choose different social states a, ^  aj 
for individuals i , j  whenever i and j  are different members of Af, even though this 
may well be impossible in practice.
In addition to social states in the conventional sense, it will be convenient to 
consider also for each i 6 M  a space of personal characteristics 8i £ 0 ;. Such 
characteristics determine i’s preferences, interests, talents, and everything else 
(apart from the social state) which is ethically relevant in determining the welfare 
of individual i. In Section 11 below, 01 will even be used to indicate whether 
individual i ever comes into existence or not.
For each individual i, a personal consequence is a pair Z{ =  (a,, 0t) in the 
Cartesian product set Z, :=  .4, x 0 , of personalized social states a, and personal 
characteristics Then, in a society whose membership M  is fixed, a typical 
social consequence consists of a profile zM =  (ri)igM £ Z M :=  J [|gM Z, of such 
personal consequences — one for each individual member of society (both actual 
and potential). The consequence domain Y  =  Z M will then consist of all such 
social consequences, with typical member y =  zM.
The four consequentialist axioms given in Sections 3, 4 and 6 above can now 
be applied to a social behaviour norm /? (T, n) defined at all decision nodes n of all 
decision trees T in the domain of finite decision trees with consequences in Z M. 




























































































of von Neumann-Morgenstern social welfare functions W (y) =  W (z M), defined on 
the space of social consequences, such that the social behaviour norm 0  maximizes 
the expected value w (zM) in every social decision tree. Thus, the only difference 
so far from Section 6 is that the consequence domain has become one of social 
consequences. What is most important, however, is the idea that each personal 
consequence zt £ Zt captures everything of ethical relevance to individual i —  by 
definition, nothing else, including no other individual’s personal consequences, can 
possibly be relevant to i ’s welfare.
8. Individualistic Consequentialism
A general random social consequence is a joint probability distribution p £ 
A(ZM) over the product space Z M of different individuals’ personal consequences. 
Such personal consequences could be correlated between different individuals, or 
they could be independent. The extent of this correlation is of no consequence to 
any individual, however. Provided that everything relevant to individual i £ M  
really has been incorporated in each personal consequence Zj £ Zj, all that really 
matters to i is the distribution p, 6 A (Z ,) of these consequences. This leads to the 
individualistic consequentialism hypothesis that any two lotteries p, q £ A (Z M) 
are equivalent random consequences whenever, for every individual i 6 M , the 
marginal distributions p; =  §,• 6 A (Zj) of i ’s consequences are the same. This 
means that in any two decision trees T, T' for which the feasible sets F(T), F (T ') 
are identical except that p 6 F(T ) \ F(T ') but q £ F(T ') \ F (T ), the social 
behaviour norm 0  must lead to sets of random consequences satisfying
p G $g(T ) <=> q G «^ (T ').
It also means that if any such pair p,q G F (T ) for any decision tree T  in the 
domain, then
pG ^p(T) 9 G $^(T).




























































































3-6, we see that
Pi — <?i (all i 6 M ) = >  E ptv(zM) =  E qw (zM)
—  i.e., p and q must be indifferent according to the relevant expected utility 
criterion.
Succinctly stated, individual consequentialism amounts to requiring that only 
each individual’s distribution of personal consequences be relevant to any social 
distribution. There is no reason to consider ay correlation between different indi­
viduals’ personal consequences.
9. Individual Welfarism
The second individualistic axiom which I shall use is that there is an individual 
welfare behaviour norm defined for all “individualistic” decision trees. The latter 
are trees for which there is only one individual whose distribution of personal 
consequences is affected by any decision within the tree. Thus, if i £ M  denotes 
the only individual affected in the tree T, then there must be a set of fixed lotteries 
ph £ A (Zh) (h 6 M  \ { i } )  for each individual h other than i, as well as a set 
Fi(T) C A (Z{) of lotteries over personal consequences for individual i, such that
r < x ) .  r ,< r ) * n ,
A decision tree with this property will be called an individualistic decision tree. 
If i £ M  is the only individual affected by decision in the tree T, then T  can be 
called an i-decision tree. Let T\ denote the set of all such trees.
The crucial hypothesis to be introduced now is that there is an individual 
welfare behaviour norm /?;(T, n) defined for every individual i 6 M  and every de­
cision node n of every i-decision tree T 6 Ti. It is this norm which, by definition, 
should represent ethical behaviour when only i is affected by whatever decision is 
taken. Moreover, it is natural to require /?; to satisfy the consequentialist axioms 
stated in Sections 3, 4 and 6 above, and even to do so in a way which is indepen­




























































































consequences to i are affected by any decision, the fixed consequences to all other 
individuals are ethically irrelevant — assuming, as I do, that everything relevant 
to ethical decision making is already included in the consequences, and that only 
(distributions over) personal consequences matter. In symbols, this requires that 
whenever i 6 M  and T € Ti is an f-decision tree with pj, (h € M  \ { i } )  as the set 
of random consequences for individuals h ^  i, then the sets $p(T) and $£,.(2’ ) of 
social consequences and of Vs personal consequences which are revealed as chosen 
by the social norm (3 and by the individual norm /?,- respectively, should satisfy
Thus, whenever there is “no choice” in the personal consequences of all other 
individuals, the social norm becomes effectively identical to the only affected indi­
vidual’s welfare norm. This is the assumption of individual welfarism to be used 
below. Note especially that it poses no restrictions on what is allowed to count 
as part of a personal consequence and so to affect each individual’s welfare. All it 
says is that, in “one person situations,” social welfare is effectively identified with 
that person’s individual welfare.
In combination with the other consequentialist axioms, individual welfarism 
obviously implies the existence of a unique cardinal equivalence class of individual 
welfare functions Wi(z{) for each i 6 M . These have the property that each 
individual Vs welfare norm /3; will always yield in every i-decision tree T a set 
of random consequences each member of which maximizes with respect
to p, £ A (Zi) the expected value E Pj u>;(zi) of uq over the set T’i(T) of feasible 





























































































Individual welfarism has a much more powerful implication, however, when 
it is combined with individualistic consequentialism as defined in Section 8. For 
suppose that the two lotteries p,q(z A (Z M) are such that
E Pi w fai) =  E ?i Wi(zj)
for all i £ M , where />,, </, 6 A (Z l) denote the respective marginal distributions 
over just i ’s personal consequences. Now order the individuals i e  M  so that 
M  =  { t'i, t2, . . . ,  ir } where r is the total number of individuals. We shall prove by 
induction on the integer s that, if w denotes a social welfare function as defined 
in Section 7, then
E„ u(zM) =  E p ,qir ™ { z M )
for s =  1 to r. Note that the expectations in this equation are taken with respect to 
two distributions having identical marginal distributions for all individuals except 
i3. Indeed, to show that the above equation is true, it suffices to consider an 
^-decision tree T  in which
= n ; : ;  o».-.} x < > * n L + .  >•
Then, since E Pjj Wi,(zi,) =  E ?ij by hypothesis, it must be true that
( r )  =  {pi, ,qi, }. So individual welfarism implies that
•w=uzi {?'.}x *A.(r) x n;=s+1 m=im
and so the equality above does indeed follow. Stringing all these r equations 
together then implies that
B p w( zm) =  TE,w(zm). 
Thus it has been proved that




























































































Yet this is precisely the crucial hypothesis of Harsanyi’s (1955) utilitarian theorem. 
Indeed, given the Cartesian product structure of the social consequence domain 
Z M =  n <€A# there is not even any need here to amend Harsanyi’s original 
proof. The implication of this theorem is that there must exist an additive constant 
a  and a set of multiplicative constants <$, (i £ M ) such that
w(zM) =  a +  ^ 2 ieM <5. Wi(zi).
Moreover, individual welfarism implies that maximizing E p w (zM) must be equiv­
alent to maximizing E Pl. u>t(zt) in any i-decision tree, where pi is the marginal 
distribution margz .p. So w (zM) and io,'(z,') must be cardinally equivalent when 
w (zM) is regarded as a function of z; alone. This evidently implies that each 
constant Si ( i G M ) is actually positive. Then, however, since the individual and 
social welfare functions are only unique up to a cardinal equivalence class, for 
each i £ M  we can replace the individual welfare function uq(zi) by the cardinally 
equivalent function ui(z;) :=  Si Wi(zi), and the social welfare function w (zM) by 
the cardinally equivalent function w (zM) w (zM) — a. The result is that
w(zM) =  w(zM) -  a = £ . 6M Si Wi(zi) = M * i)
and so one is back to simple addition of individual “utilities,” once these have all 
been suitably normalized. Because of this possible normalization, I shall assume 
in future that
=  E , 6m
Note, however, that these utilities are by no means the same as those in other 
more traditional versions of utilitarianism. They are merely representations of ap­
propriate ethical decisions in individualistic decision trees, without any necessary 
relationship to classical or other concepts of utility such as happiness, pleasure, 
absence of pain, preference satisfaction, etc. And the additive structure arises 
from a combination of independence as regards revealed preferences over lotter­




























































































faced by all other individuals. The latter independence property is an implication 
of individual welfarism, as defined in Section 9.
11. Variable Population
So far the set of individuals M  has been treated as though it were fixed. Yet 
many ethical issues surround decisions which affect the set of individuals who come 
into existence — both the number and the composition of the set M. Thus, it 
would seem that M  itself should be treated as variable consequence along with 
z M, as indeed it was in Hammond (1988b).
A simpler alternative, however, is to treat “non-existence” for any individual 
i & M  as a particular personal characteristic 9° 6 0 ;  which i could have, and 
then to define M  as the set of all potential rather than actual individuals. Thus 
M  is divided into the two sets M* :=  { i 6 M  \ /  9® } of actual individuals
who do come into existence, and M ° :=  { i € M  | 9{ =  9° } of individuals whose 
potential existence never comes about in practice. Actually, not much is lost by 
doing this. Assuming that only a finite number of individuals can ever be born 
before the world comes to an end (as seems quite reasonable, despite economists’ 
models of steady state growth etc.), one can regard each i £ M  as just an integer 
used to number each individual who comes into existence, more or less in order 
of date of birth. Everything that is really relevant about an individual i , includ­
ing date of birth, can be included in Vs individual characteristic 9,. Thus every 
individual who is ever bom certainly gets numbered. But we can also consider 
the (finite) maximum number N * of individuals who could ever be born, and then 
let M  =  { 1 ,2 ,... ,1V* }. Then, unless all IV* individuals do actually come into 
existence, there will be “unused” numbers which refer to potential rather than 
actual individuals.
For those individuals i £ M ° who never come into existence, the concept 
of individual welfare hardly makes any sense. In decision-theoretic terms, this 
means that non-existent individuals are not affected by social decisions — all 




























































































into existence, of course). Consider now any i-decision tree T with the property 
that p 6 F;(T) only if p(A i x {(?“ }) =  1 — i.e., the probability of i not existing is 
always 1, no matter what decision is taken in the tree T. Since all decisions in T 
are the same to this certainly non-existent individual, it follows that at all decision 
nodes n in this tree i 's welfare norm /i,(T, n) can be allowed to make any decisions 
on i’s behalf. Therefore /3,(T,n) =  7V+j(n) and so =  Ft(T) whenever
T is an i-decision tree like this. What this means is that for some constant tu® 
the individual welfare function uq(z;) should satisfy uq(a;,#“ ) =  w® for all a* £ 
Ai. Thus can be regarded as the constant “utility of non-existence,” which is 
entirely independent of the social state or any aspect of any social consequence in 
which i never exists.
Assuming this to be true, one more useful normalization of individuals’ welfare 
functions is possible. We can replace each uq(z;) by the cardinally equivalent 
function
u>i(zi) :=  Wi(zi) -  w°
because a constant is merely being subtracted. Then, of course, u)i(ai, 0®) =  0 for 
all ai £ A,. This implies that Wi(zi) =  0 whenever i £ M°.
We can also replace w (zM) =  wi(zi) by
w(zM) =  w(zM) ~ Y ^ , eM
for exactly the same reason. Then, however,
s  £ 16M s  £ , 6M *<(*•■) =  E 1£M. ^ ( 2>)
where M* is the set of individuals who come into existence. So only individuals 
in the set M * need be considered when adding all individuals’ welfare levels.
Once again, it will be assumed from now on that this normalization has been 
carried out. Therefore one has




























































































where M * =  { i G M  \ S; /  8° }.
Note that this is formally identical to classical utilitarianism. But, as pointed 
out in Section 10, the resemblance is only formal because the functions uq(z;) 
mean something quite different. In particular, the zero level of this function is, by 
its very construction, just that level of individual welfare at which it is ethically 
appropriate for the individual to come into existence. This does much to dilute 
the strength of Parfit’s (1984) “repugnant conclusion,” for instance, because the 
ethical values embodied in the function uq(zi) could be such as to make w, positive 
only if individual i would actually be quite well off if allowed to come into existence. 
There is no presumption that for the individual to be glad to be alive is enough 
by itself to make uq(z;) positive.
Note too that having uq(zj) positive would only be a sufficient condition for 
wanting i to exist if that could somehow come about without interfering with 
anybody else. Yet children cannot exist without having (or having had) parents. 
So the benefits (and losses) to i of coming into existence have to be weighed against 
any costs (or benefits) to other individuals, especially Vs parents, etc. Some further 
discussion of such issues occurs in Hammond (1988b).
12. Interpersonal Comparisons
In the introduction I criticized Sen’s social welfare functional approach to 
social choice theory on the grounds that it never made explicit the interpersonal 
comparisons on which it was based. It is now my duty to explain how the utilitarian 
theory expounded above remedies this defect.
In fact, as pointed out in Hammond (1991b), there are interpersonal compar­
isons embodied in the social welfare function
These comparisons also meet Myerson’s (1985) criticism that interpersonal com­




























































































society is better off creating individual h with personal consequence zj, rather than 
individual i with personal consequence z;. And wj,(z/,) — wh(z'k) < w^z'^ — Wi(zi), 
which is of course equivalent to w/,(zh) +  wi(zi) <  104(2 )̂ +  tt>i(z|), really does 
mean that moving h from zj, to z'h and i from Zj to zj produces a benefit to society 
(if nobody else is affected) because any loss to h is outweighed by the gain to i, 
or vice versa. Indeed, even welfare ratios acquire meaning. For Wh(zh)/u>i(zi) can 
be regarded as the marginal rate of substitution between individuals like h facing 
personal consequence zk and individuals like i facing personal consequence z,. If 
this ratio is greater than 1 , for instance, then society could gain by creating more 
individuals like h and fewer like i.
Thus we have a “cardinal ratio scale” measure of individual welfare, with 
“cardinal full comparability” of both welfare levels and differences, as well as a 
clearly defined zero level of welfare. Yet, of all the social welfare functionals 
considered by Roberts (1980) which have this property, only the simple sum is 
ethically appropriate — according to the theory expounded above. So the social 
welfare functional is no longer indeterminate, as it usually is in with this approach 
to social choice theory. Of course, this extra determinacy of the functional form 
comes at a price, since now all the indeterminacy has been displaced into the 
individual welfare function. In Sen’s version of the theory, one could argue that the 
utility measure had some objective reality which was independent of any particular 
values; here the individual welfare measure has instead been defined so that it 





























































































In the introductory Section 1 there were four questions which, I suggested, 
any social choice theoretic approach to ethics should be able to answer. The reader 
is invited to review them once again, along with the two succeeding paragraphs 
which summarized the answers that were going to be provided.
The theory has been based upon the idea of a social behaviour norm, defined 
for decision trees in which multi-stage decisions and compound lotteries combine to 
give random social consequences. The social consequences to be considered amount 
to interpersonal profiles of personal consequences, with each personal consequence 
summarizing everything which is ethically relevant to the corresponding individual. 
There should be a social norm for society as a whole, and also individual welfare 
norms specifying what decisions are ethically acceptable when only one individual’s 
consequences can be affected by the decision. The relevant individual’s welfare 
norm should coincide with the social norm in all such “one person situations.”
Four axioms were imposed upon such behaviour norms. The first was un­
restricted domain, requiring the norm to be defined for all finite decision trees 
in which only positive probabilities could occur at any chance node. The sec­
ond was consistency in continuation subtrees, requiring the same behaviour to 
be acceptable at any decision node of a tree regardless of whether that node is 
regarded as belonging to the whole tree or to only a continuation subtree. The 
third “consequentialist” axiom was the crucial one — that knowledge of the fea­
sible set of consequence lotteries arising from a decision tree would always suffice 
to determine a “revealed choice set” of consequence lotteries which could result 
from recommended behaviour. Later on this was further strengthened so that, in 
society, only the profile of marginal probability distributions over different individ­
uals’ personal consequences were relevant to recommended behaviour. A fourth 
technical axiom of continuity was finally imposed which had the effect of ruling 
out lexicographic preferences.




























































































welfare norms which represent the social norm in one person situations, there 
follows a form of classical utilitarianism which is close in spirit to that of Harsanyi 
(1955), even if the interpretation of individual utilities is quite different. There is 
a unique cardinal equivalence class of “von Neumann-Morgenstern social welfare 
functions” whose expected values society should maximize. Moreover, each such 
social welfare function can be expressed as the sum of individual welfare functions 
whose expected values it is right to maximize in one person situations where only 
one individual’s personal consequence lottery is affected by any decision that could 
be made.
Finally, on the assumption that decisions affecting individuals who never came 
into existence regardless of what decision is made do not matter and so can be 
made arbitrarily, it was shown that individuals’ welfare functions could be nor­
malized to be zero for individuals who never exist. Then it is enough to sum the 
welfare levels of all individuals who do come into existence, and even to use this 
criterion to determine who should come into existence — exactly as with classical 
utilitarianism. The obvious defects of that ethical theory are avoided, however, 
by interpreting individual welfare as a purely ethical concept representing what 
behaviour ought to maximize in decision trees affecting the personal consequences 
of only one individual.
In the end, the theory that has been sketched here determines completely the 
formal structure of the ethical decision criterion. Yet this formal structure remains 
an empty shell, to be completed by substantive ethical statements concerning what 
should count as an ethically relevant consequence, and even about what decisions 
really would be right in certain practical decision problems. The real work in ethics 
may only just be beginning. It promises to be much more interesting than the 
rather dry arguments about whether or not utilitarianism or consequentialism are 
appropriate. I have set out such arguments here only to explain why I personally 
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